Over the last decade, the Brazilian banking industry has undergone major and deep transformations with several privatizations of state-owned banks, mergers and acquisitions, closing down of troubled banks, entry by foreign banks, etc. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of these changes in banking total factor productivity. We first obtain measures of bank level productivity by employing the techniques due to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . We then relate such measures to a set of bank characteristics. Our main results indicate that state-owned banks are less productive than their private peers, and that privatization has increased productivity.
Introduction
The banking system in Brazil is the largest and the most complex one in Latin America. Like in many parts of the world, the banking industry in Brazil is undergoing a process of rapid and radical transformations. The common features of this process, in Brazil and elsewhere, include: an increase in competition from within the industry as well as from the outside; a wave of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities, including several cross-border deals; more globalized capital markets with highly volatile capital flows, which are capable of causing havoc in some national financial sectors; new financial products, with increasing reliance on off-balance sheet activities; new banking practices brought out by the information technology revolution.
The banking sector in Brazil has been strongly influenced by the changing domestic macroeconomic scene of the recent period, especially by the transition from a high to a low inflation environment. After many years of making a living out of inflationary rents, this transition was far from smooth for many banks. The Brazilian experience represents an interesting case study on bank privatization not only because of its quantitative relevance but also due to the varied options given to the state-owned banks following their restructuring. Thus, some stateowned banks were straight privatized by their controllers (namely, the Brazilian states) whereas some others had their control first transferred from the states to the federal government and then privatized. Some other states also kept the control of their banks after restructuring. There are also some other state-owned banks that were just liquidated.
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the privatization of stateowned banks on productivity. Measures of bank-level total factor productivity are first obtained as the residuals from a production function estimate. The production function is estimated following the methodology suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to try to control for endogeneity problems arising from the simultaneous choice of inputs and productivity by the bank firm.
In a second stage, bank total factor productivity is related to a set of control variables. In an environment where many different types of corporate control changes are occurring simultaneously, it is important to try to control for as many of them as possible even though the primary interest of the paper lies on the effects of bank privatization. This is certainly the case for Brazil whereby privatization of state-owned banks were taking place alongside other corporate changes in the industry like domestic mergers and acquisitions, foreign acquisition of domestic banks, liquidation of banks, and pure exit from the market. We therefore follow the methodology proposed by Berger et al. (2003) and include variables controlling for static, selection, and dynamic effects. Static variables are dummies for groups of banks that have not had any corporate change over the sample period. Selection variables are dummies for groups of banks that have had some corporate change over the sample period. Such dummy variables are equal to one over the whole sample period for the corresponding banks.
Dynamic variables are of two forms. A first set of dynamic variables are dummies for those banks that have had some corporate change over the sample period taking the value one only for the time periods following the change. A second set of dynamic variables track the number of time periods following the change. In addition to the static, selection, and dynamic variables we also included a set of dummy variables for those banks that have exited the market. Exit can occur either because the bank has been liquidated or because the bank has changed the nature of its activities.
Our main results show that state-owned banks are less productive than privateowned ones. Brazilian state-owned banks face severe agency problems due to their use for political, and social purposes. Another main result of the paper is that privatization has had a positive impact on productivity. Moreover, the positive effects of privatization seem to take some time to materialize. Privatization proved also to be a superior strategy than restructuring and keeping the bank under state control. On the other hand, we could not find any strong performance differences related to the way a state-owned bank was privatized (i.e., straight privatization or federalization followed by privatization). We find no strong differences in the performances of the state-owned banks sold to foreign ones vis a vis state-owned banks sold to domestic ones either. This paper contributes to the literature on bank productivity. The study of bank productivity is relevant because productivity is a summary performance measure. Thus, productivity analysis may be relevant to those involved in bank M&A issues, like bank practitioners or bank competition authorities. Also, to the extent that low productivity can work as an early warning, bank supervision authorities may use productivity measures as an additional monitoring instrument. Bank productivity studies are also useful due to the well-documented evidence that a bank system that efficiently channels available resources to productive uses is a powerful mechanism for economic growth [Levine (1997) ]. This paper is also related to the literature on bank privatization. The empirical literature in this area takes the form of either cross-country studies or analyses of individual countries.
1 This literature provides broad support to the conclusions reached in this paper on the poorer performance of state-owned banks and on the beneficial impacts of bank privatization.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the banking industry in Brazil, with a special emphasis on the state-owned sector. Section 3 describes the methodology to be applied in the empirical sections. Section 4 discusses data-related issues. Section 5 estimates the coefficients of a production function, from which the bank-level productivity measures are calculated. Section 6 studies the determinants of bank productivity, highlighting the role played by bank privatization.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
Overview of the banking sector in Brazil
The launching of the stabilization plan, called the Real Plan, in July 1994 with the subsequent transition to an environment of more stable prices proved to be very costly to the Brazilian banks. During the high-inflation period, banks could profit from inflation transfers. Inflation imposes a tax over the holders of money and non-interest bearing deposits. As issuers of demand deposits, commercial banks receive part of the inflation tax. According to ANDIMA-IBGE (1997) , the inflationary transfers to the banking system fell from an average of 3.4% of GDP in the 1990-93 period to 1.8% in 1994, and to 0.03% in 1995.
In the immediate aftermath of the stabilization plan, Brazilian banks tried to make up for the inflationary losses by increasing credit. Total loans of the financial system went up 43.7% after the first eight months of the stabilization plan. The rapid increase in the concession of loans was not followed by a careful consideration of the risk characteristics of those seeking credit. When the Central Bank dramatically increased the reserve requirements on deposits in the second half of 1994, coupled with the continuation of a policy of high interest rates, a credit retrenchment followed. Nonperforming loans started to accumulate fast.
With the imminent insolvency of some big private banks 2 a bailout mechanism was put in place in November 1995 3 . Under this program, the Central Bank was given the mandate to compel a fragile bank to: a) increase its capital, or b) to transfer its shareholder control, or c) to be merged or acquired by another bank. PROER made easier for stronger financial institutions to acquire weaker ones by allowing the acquiring financial institutions to record as a premium the difference between the acquisition value and the market value of the acquired institution. Non-performing loans were recognized as losses and, under certain conditions, the premium could be used as a tax credit. It also allowed forbearance in the form of a temporary waive of the Basle minimum capital requirement for the ailing participants. In order to reduce the moral hazard problems associated to bailout schemes, PROER set out that banks could only qualify for official help when the ownership control was agreed to be transferred to some other institution. Seven banking institutions were restructured under the PROER resources.
The PROER program only reached private banks. A similar program aiming at the state-owned banks was launched in August 1996, the PROES 4 . The aim of this program was not only to reduce the participation of the Brazilian states (provinces) in the banking activity but also to address their chronic public debt problems 5 . Debt restructuring packages were offered for those states who agreed to give one of the 2 In August 1995, Banco Economico, the eight largest in the country by net worth, fell under Central Bank intervention. In November 1995, the same fate hit Banco Nacional, the sixth largest in the country by net worth. 3 Program of Incentives to the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System, PROER. 4 Program of Incentives to the Reduction of the State-Level Public Sector in the Bank Activity. See also Baer and Nazmi (2000) , and Ness Jr. (2000) for more details. 5 The two problems were not unrelated: state-level banks were the main purchasers of the public bonds issued by their main shareholders, the states themselves. Werlang and Fraga Neto (1995) The whole set of measures put in place drastically changed the ownership composition of the banking sector in the country. Tables 1 to 5 document such changes along several dimensions. Owned TOTAL  1994  146  31  37  32  246  1995  142  32  36  32  242  1996  130  29  40  32  231  1997  119  26  45  27  217  1998  105  17  58  23  203  1999  96  12  67  19  194  2000  93  13  69  17  192  2001  82  14  70  16  182  2002  75  10  56  14  155 6 See Appendix 1 for a list of the liquidated and privatized banks. Tables 2 to 5 9 show that private domestic banks managed to keep their share of the bank system net worth, assets, and deposits. This group of banks even increased their share of the bank system loans.
Foreign controlled banks increased significantly their market penetration in the country. In 2002, they accounted for 33.6% of the bank system net worth, 27.7% of the bank system assets, 20.1% of the bank system deposits, and 30.5% of the bank system loans.
Despite the great reduction in the importance of the state-owned banks, they still account for significant shares of the bank system net worth (16.6%), assets (35%), deposits (42.7%), and loans (29.1%). 9 In tables 2 to 5, the foreign minority group is incorporated into the private domestic group.
Methodology
Productivity is defined as any variation in output that cannot be explained by variations in inputs. On this account, productivity changes can be due either to variations in efficiency or to changes in technology.
The methodology to be applied in this paper follows the approach developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) . A panel data for Brazilian banks will be used with the aim of estimating the parameters of a production function. In usual fashion, productivity is measured as the residual from this relation.
Olley and Pakes' approach allows one to consistently estimate the production function coefficients taking into consideration two possible sources of bias, namely a sample selection and a simultaneity bias.
The sample selection bias refers to the fact that many banks left the market during the sample period. It is reasonable to imagine that the unobservable productivity variable and the decision to leave the market are correlated, causing a potential sample selection problem. The simultaneity problem is related to the correlation between the unobservable productivity variable and the amount of inputs chosen by the bank.
The authors deal with both problems by first modeling the optimal firm decision regarding both the use of inputs as well as the market exit/no exit. The solution to the firm control problem takes the form of an exit rule and an investment demand function, respectively given by: The procedure to be adopted in the estimation can be illustrated taking the example of a Cobb-Douglas production function:
where y it is the log of the output of firm i in period t, k it is the log of its capital stock, l it is the log of its labor input, it ω is its productivity, and it η is an error stochastic term.
Notice that both ω and η are not observed by the econometrician. The difference between them is that ω is a state variable in the firm decision problem and therefore it affects both the exit decision as well as the demand for inputs, while η has no such implications.
Olley and Pakes propose a three-step procedure to estimate the coefficients of (3) taking into consideration the sample selection and the simultaneity problems. In order to implement the first step, the inversion of (2), which is strictly increasing in ω , allows one to write:
Equation (4) expresses the unobserved productivity variable as a function of observable variables. By replacing (4) in (3) it is possible therefore to control for ω in the estimation:
where:
The "partially linear" model (5)- (6) is a semiparametric regression model. The first step in the estimation allows the identification of the variable input coefficient l β , but it does not allow the identification of the fixed input coefficient k β . That is, the estimation of (5)-(6) does not allow one to separate the effect of capital on output from the effect on the investment decision.
The second step involves the determination of the survival probability. After replacing (4) in (1), it is possible to express the survival probability as a function of observable variables only:
where J t is the information set available at t. Equation (7) can be alternatively estimated by probit/logit, where polynomial terms of i t and k t are used as regressors, or by non parametric methods.
The third step in the estimation begins with the assumption that productivity follows a first-order Markov process:
[ ]
By making use of the previous results, it is possible to show that
can be written in regression form as:
Since it is assumed that the capital stock in a given period is known at the beginning of the period, it then follows that 1 + t ξ and k t+1 are independent variables, which makes possible the consistent estimation of k β in (9). However, since 1 + t ξ and l t+1 are not independent variables, one can see the need for the first step estimation. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) introduced an important improvement in the Olley and Pakes' methodology by making use of an intermediate input instead of investment as a proxy variable for the productivity. Investment can only work as a valid proxy if it does not take zero values, which can be a very restrictive condition for the data sets typically found in developing countries.
Levinsohn and Petrin also argue that the monotonicity condition required for the inversion of (2) may not be valid due to capital adjustment costs. The monotonicity condition for investment is then replaced by an equivalent requirement for the
Another requirement for the use of the intermediate input as a proxy for productivity is an assumption of competitive market.
The indexation of the (.) τ function by t allows for temporal changes in prices although variation across firms is not allowed.
The methodology advanced by Levinsohn and Petrin does not require separability of all intermediate inputs in the production function. It is required that only one intermediate input be separable such that its isolated contribution to output can be computed. The authors choose electricity as the productivity proxy on the account that all firms need such input. Moreover, in their sample, there was no firm producing or selling electricity, which can be interpreted as an impossibility for storing such input, making it highly correlated with contemporaneous productivity levels.
The previous equations can then be adapted to the Levinsohn and Petrin extension:
where it e is electricity, and
Under the assumption that productivity follows a first-order Markov process, one obtains:
Lagging (12) one period, replacing in (13), and replacing the result in (11), one obtains:
Expression (14) requires the knowledge of 1 − t ϕ , which can be estimated in the first-step. Equation (14) is then used to estimate e β and k β by non-linear least squares.
In addition to the replacement of investment by an intermediate input as a proxy for productivity, Levinsohn and Petrin do not consider the estimation of the second step in the Olley and Pakes algorithm. In other terms, they do not account for the sample selection bias. Levinsohn and Petrin argue that the use of an unbalanced panel controls, to some extent, for such bias. Moreover, both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (1999) found that controlling for selection has little effect on the final parameter estimates.
Data and sample
The empirical section of the paper aims at estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function having a measure of bank output as the dependent variable and three productive inputs as explanatory variables. Appendix 2 gives more detailed information on data sources and variable definitions.
The inputs are labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. Following Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003), a separate intermediate input is used as a proxy variable for productivity.
Unlike the manufacturing sector, however, the use of electricity as a proxy variable in the banking industry does not seem to be warranted. We therefore take communications as our proxy for the unobserved productivity. Capital stock is treated as a fixed input since adjustment costs may prevent instantaneous reallocations of such input. As for labor, we treat it alternatively as a variable and as a fixed factor.
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Measurement of bank output is more controversial, with many approaches being proposed in the literature 11 . Here, output is measured as the value of total bank working assets, making our model consistent with the intermediation approach. Haynes and Thompson (1999) use a similar procedure. Some empirical studies use bank deposits either as output or as input of the bank activity. However, because of the relevance of bank deposits in the liability side of a bank balance sheet, the inclusion of them would cause a serious problem in the estimation of the production function, due to the accounting identity equating total assets and total liabilities. In the present study therefore bank deposits are not included in the bank production process.
The source of the accounting data is COSIF (Accounting Plan of the National Financial System Institutions), elaborated by the Brazilian Central Bank, and by which all the financial institutions operating in the country have to report balance sheet and income statements on a monthly basis. The accounts for (end of) June and (end of)
December of each year during the period from December 1990 to December 2002 were used.
The sample is unbalanced with 242 commercial banks. All the observations with zero values for the output or for one of the inputs were excluded from the analysis. In addition, banks with less than three observations, and outliers were also excluded. The final sample contains 4,444 observations 12 . Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample variables for both the whole sample period, 1990-2002, and also for two sub-periods, 1990-1995, and 1996-2002 . The privatizations of the public-owned banks are concentrated in the second subperiod. The dispersion of the variables across banks is very large, with the standard errors being nearly four times larger than the mean values. There is no discernible difference between the two sub-periods in this regard. Firm bank heterogeneity is therefore very significant in the sample and for both sub-periods.
Mean production increases between the two sub-periods, alongside concomitant reductions in the use of labor and capital. Intermediate inputs, by contrast, have increased between the two sub-periods. J u n -9 0 D e c -9 0 J u n -9 1 D e c -9 1 J u n -9 2 D e c -9 2 J u n -9 3 D e c -9 3 J u n -9 4 D e c -9 4 J u n -9 5 D e c -9 5 J u n -9 6 D e c -9 6 J u n -9 7 D e c -9 7 J u n -9 8 D e c -9 8 J u n -9 9 D e c -9 9 J u n - J u n -9 0 D e c -9 0 J u n -9 1 D e c -9 1 J u n -9 2 D e c -9 2 J u n -9 3 D e c -9 3 J u n -9 4 D e c -9 4 J u n -9 5 D e c -9 5 J u n -9 6 D e c -9 6 J u n -9 7 D e c -9 7 J u n -9 8 D e c -9 8 J u n -9 9 D e c -9 9 J u n - 
Estimation of bank productivity
This section implements Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology to obtain measures of productivity for a sample of Brazilian banks. In the next section, the banklevel productivity measures so obtained are regressed on a number of control variables, including, among them, dummy variables representing privatization of state-owned banks. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) The first step of the algorithm involves the estimation of the following "partially linear" equation: (15) labor is considered as a variable factor. We also estimated models where labor is treated as a fixed factor.
When this is the case, labor is also incorporated in the polynomial series expansion.
The first step of the estimation allows one to obtain consistent estimates of the variable factor coefficients, l β and i β . Once these coefficients are obtained, we compute the term:
This term is then regressed on a polynomial series in
. The fitted value from this regression is denoted
In the second step, consistent estimates for c β and k β are obtained through non-linear least squares applied to:
where it ξ is the innovation term in productivity. The labor coefficient in the least squares estimation is negative, and marginally significant. When labor is treated as a variable factor in the L-P approach, its coefficient becomes even more negative and highly significant this time. The last column of Table   7 shows the estimates of the L-P approach when labor is treated as a fixed factor. This model shows more reasonable values for the estimated coefficients, although the statistical significance of the capital stock coefficient is still low 14 . Thus, for the remaining of the analysis, the coefficients shown in the third column are used as the estimates for the bank production function. 13 The standard errors of the coefficients for the fixed inputs and for communications in the L-P models were obtained by bootstrap resampling 100 times. There are fewer observations in the L-P models due to the use of lagged terms in the estimation of (17). 14 The results are robust to different cutoff values for the outliers (0.5%, 1%, 2%), and also to different degrees for the polynomial expansion series (fourth and fifth degrees).
As discussed in section 3, it is important that monotonicity with respect to productivity holds for the communications input. If this assumption is violated, we cannot invert this function to express productivity as a function of observable variables.
In order to check the validity of this assumption, communications was regressed on productivity and on the fixed inputs (capital and labor). All the estimated coefficients are positive and significant.
Bank-level (log of) total factor productivity is computed as the difference between actual and fitted output, given by:
Aggregate bank productivity is calculated as the weighted bank-level productivity for each period, where the weight is given by the market share of each bank product in each time period. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the aggregate productivity alongside a more standard measure of productivity, namely labor productivity J u n -9 0 D e c -9 0 J u n -9 1 D e c -9 1 J u n -9 2 D e c -9 2 J u n -9 3 D e c -9 3 J u n -9 4 D e c -9 4 J u n -9 5 D e c -9 5 J u n -9 6 D e c -9 6 J u n -9 7 D e c -9 7 J u n -9 8 D e c -9 8 J u n -9 9 D e c -9 9 J u n -0 0 D e c -0 0 J u n -0 1 D e c -0 1 J u n -0 2 D e c -0 2 log TFP log labor productivity
The two aggregate productivity measures display similar temporal patterns although their numerical scales differ. It is interesting to notice that labor productivity underestimates total factor productivity in banking, which is the opposite of what is found for the manufacturing sector in Brazil [Muendler (2002) , Schor (2003) ]. One possible reason for these differences is the large fall in the capital stock in banking shown in Figure 3 , whereas capital stock has increased in the manufacturing sectors over the 1990's.
Aggregate total factor productivity increases up to June 1997, remaining fairly flat after it. The accumulated productivity growth over the entire period is 13.48%, or an average annual growth rate of 1.02%. There is great heterogeneity across sub-periods though. In the period from June 1990 to June 1997, the average annual growth rate 
Determinants of bank productivity
This section attempts to study the determinants of bank productivity. Special attention is paid to the role of the ownership structure. In face of an environment whereby different corporate changes are affecting the industry, Berger et al. (2003) argue that it is important to control for as many of the changes as possible. The dynamic dummy variables capture the once-and-for-all changes associated to the interventions. However, in addition to this level effect, the interventions can have differentiated impacts over time. We therefore also created variables measuring the time lapsed since the intervention. Since we use 6-month observations in our sample, such variables are measured in semesters. Ten time variables were created, one for each dynamic dummy variable. The labels for such variables follow the same pattern as the ones defined for the dynamic dummy variables with time replacing ddynamic. For example, time_federalized_privatized_foreign_datefederalization measures the time since a state-owned bank that was federalized, privatized and acquired by a foreign bank was federalized. Typically, the time variables take the value one in the semester when the intervention occurred, the value two in the following semester, and so on.
We follow Berger et al. (2003) and actually exclude from the sample all observations for which the time variables equal one. In other terms, the semester during which the intervention occurred is not considered in the sample. The reason for this treatment is to try to control for noise introduced during the event of intervention, which usually produces some discontinuities in previous policies, involves legal costs associated to the intervention, etc.
In addition to the static, selection, and dynamic variables we created another group of variables to deal with the banks that exited the market. In addition to the above mentioned variables we also included two additional control variables given by the lagged market share (market_share), as measured by the share of each bank output in the sector output in each period, and lagged bank size
given by the number of bank branches (branches). Time dummies were also included in the estimated regressions, with the aim of capturing macroeconomic effects not accounted for in the estimation. The three static dummy variables are highly significant. The results show that state-owned banks are less productive than the private domestic ones (the reference group). On the other hand, both the foreign-controlled banks and the branches of foreign banks are more productive than the private domestic group.
The five exit dummy variables are significant and one of them is positive.
Liquidated banks have lower productivity than those commercial banks that left the market due to a transformation in their activities. State-owned liquidated banks have the poorest performance within this group, followed by the private liquidated banks.
Commercial banks that left the market and became non-financial institutions were actually more productive than the private domestic banks (reference group). One possible reason for some banks to leave the market is related to the increasing costs of staying in the bank business related to more stringent prudent regulations as well as to the introduction of the new payment system in the country during 2002.
Five of the selection dummy variables are highly significant and negative. The remaining two selection variables are not significant with one of them having a positive sign. Overall, state-owned banks that underwent some corporate change are less productive than private banks that also faced some corporate change. The selection coefficients are non-significant for the latter group, indicating that their productivity is no different than the productivity of the reference group (domestic private banks).
As for the state-owned banks, there is no clear discernible pattern for the selection variables regarding the type of solution given to them. In other terms, one cannot clearly state that state-owned banks that were privatized, or that were first federalized and later privatized, or that were federalized and not privatized, or that were restructured and kept under state control have better or worse performance compared to each other. It is also not possible to state any firm conclusion related to the ownership of the acquiring bank (i.e. private domestic or foreign control) in terms of the selection of state-owned banks.
The static, exit and selection dummies plus the reference excluded group form a sample partition. One can therefore rank the groups according to the estimated coefficient for each dummy. Table 9 reports the ranking in increasing order (i.e. from the less to the more productive groups). The ordering is a weak one because some of the coefficients are not statistically different from each other. Equality coefficient tests are reported for pairs of adjacent variables and we indicate when the null is rejected. Transformed into non-financial institution *,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively F Statistics report a test of equality for the coefficient of the corresponding group and the coefficient for the group in the row immediately below. All the tests have a F(1,4094) distribution.
Group

TABLE 9 -Ranking of groups of banks according to static, exit, and selection variables
One striking result from Table 9 is that all the groups involving state-owned banks occupy the lowest positions in the rankings. Even the still active state-owned banks have significantly lower productivity than liquidated private banks. In addition to agency problems, one possible reason for the lower productivity of state-owned banks in Brazil is the "social" role they play as government agents. Thus, Banco do Brasil and CEF are major players in the concession of loans to the rural and to the low-income housing sector, respectively, usually at subsidized rates.
Returning to the results of Table 8 , only five out of the ten dynamic dummy variables are statistically significant. One of them has a negative coefficient, though, which is contrary to expectations. As a matter of fact, only five of the dynamic variables have the expected positive sign. Overall, the dynamic effects are not large in magnitude.
As in Table 9 , we can compute a weak ordering of the groups according to the estimated coefficients of the dynamic variables. Table 10 shows the results. We consider the state-owned banks that were first federalized and later privatized during two moments: the period they remained under federal control, and the period following privatization. The variables we name …datefederalization and …dateprivatization in Table 8 aim at capturing the dynamic impacts of federalization and of privatization, respectively. Thus, Table 10 reports the rankings of ten distinct groups in increasing order. 
Group
TABLE 10 -Ranking of groups of banks according to dynamic variables
The first five groups in Table 10 present negative impacts for the dynamic dummy variables. All of them involve state-owned banks. Three of such negative impacts are related to state-owned banks during periods of restructuring (either under federal or under state control). This result is not surprising because restructuring usually involves the transfer of troubled assets to the federal government. Since total assets are our measure of output, such banks may be facing a reduction in output while keeping unchanged their level of inputs and therefore reducing their productivity.
When the performance of the state-owned banks is measured after the privatization, the dynamic impacts show a more positive outcome. Three of the four possible groups improved their performance after privatization. Moreover, the way a state-owned bank was privatized seems to matter with better performance related to straight privatization (as opposed to first federalize and then privatize).
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Moreover, the ownership of the acquiring bank also seems to matter with better dynamic performance related to the privatized banks acquired by foreigners.
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Interestingly, when the corporate change involved only private banks, domestic banks seem to be associated with better dynamic performance than foreign ones, although the statistical significance for testing the difference between them is very low (F statistics equal to 1.64 with a p-value of 0.2010).
The ordering shown in Table 10 can be misleading because any given value for a dynamic variable may have different quantitative implications for different bank groups.
For example, a coefficient of, say, 0.2 for a dynamic variable may represent a tremendous improvement for a privatized state-owned bank and not such a great performance for a private bank. We therefore re-computed the rankings of the bank groups displayed in Table 9 by considering the dynamic effects of Table 10 . In other terms we add the coefficients for each selection variable and the corresponding dynamic one, comparing the result with the static and exit variables. Table 11 shows the resulting weak ranking in increasing order. For the state-owned banks that were first federalized and later privatized we show their combined performance after the privatization, i.e. we take into account the impacts of the federalization period.
when the acquiring bank is a foreign one and 3.52 (p-value equal to 0.0607) when the acquiring bank is a domestic one. 19 The statistical significance for such tests are not very high though. The tests that the dynamic effects for privatized state-owned banks acquired by foreigners and for privatized state-owned banks acquired by domestic banks are equal give F statistics of 4.52 (p-value equal to 0.0336) when the state-owned bank was privatized by the state, and 2.09 (p-value equal to 0.1486) when the state-owned bank was first federalized and then privatized. The same good performance is not verified for those privatized state-owned banks that were first federalized. The two bank groups belonging to this category lost positions in the ranking. As already mentioned, such banks faced the negative costs of restructuring, which impaired their productivity. In special, those federalized banks that were privatized and bought by domestic banks had such a poor performance that, even after the privatization, they perform no better than the liquidated state-owned banks.
Group
It is also worth mentioning that the alternative of restructuring the state-owned bank and keeping it under state control does not seem to yield good results. After taking into account the dynamic impacts, this group of banks lost one position in the ranking.
On the plus side, restructured state-owned banks have significant greater productivity than those federalized state-owned banks that have not been privatized. Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the changes affecting the stateowned banks. It shows the eight groups representing these banks during three hypothetical time periods. Time t shows the distribution previous to the corporate change, as represented by Table 9 . Time t+1 shows the impact of the first corporate change, e.g. federalization for those banks that were federalized or privatization for those banks that were privatized straight away. Time t+2 shows the final configuration, as represented by Table 10 . Overall, the results suggest that dynamic effects associated both to straight privatization and to corporate control change in the private sector worked towards improving productivity of the involved banks.
With regard to the other control variables included in the regression reported in Table 8 , the results indicate a positive effect of lagged market share, and a negative effect of the lagged number of branches on bank productivity. Notice that the use of lagged market share helps to control for a possible reverse causality channel whereby more productive banks have an edge to increase their market shares. On the other hand, the negative effect for the number of bank branches may be pointing out to scale diseconomies. The operation of extensive branch networks can impart on productivity if the branches are small and geographically dispersed.
The results reported so far assumed that the dynamic impacts of any corporate change have a "once-and-for-all" nature. A more realistic picture may be represented by a setting whereby the dynamic impacts materialize over time. More interestingly, all the four significant "time" variables are related to privatized banks. This finding gives support to the idea that productivity improvements after privatization may take some time to materialize. It is also worth mentioning that, unlike the previous findings, there is no clear dominance of one type of privatization over the other when the "over time" impacts are taken into account. There is also no clear dominance with regard to the ownership of the acquiring bank on the dynamic impacts of privatization. Figure 5 shows the results of a counterfactual experiment where the dynamic effects are allowed to vary over time. In time period one, the state-owned banks are ranked according to their static, exit, and selection coefficients displayed in Table 12 .
The ordering is exactly the same as shown in Table 9 and in Figure 4 . We then computed the number of periods during which a typical bank for each group underwent some corporate change. The number of periods is just an average for the banks within each group. It turns out that the longest time span for which an intervention involving state-owned banks was observed in the sample was 10 semesters for those banks that were first federalized and later privatized and bought by foreign banks. Thus, period two in Figure 5 computes the impact effects of federalization for these banks. Such effects are given by the sum of the coefficients for selection, dynamic (date of federalization), and time (date of federalization) variables for this group of banks. In period three, the coefficient for this group of banks is given by the sum of the coefficients for selection, dynamic (date of federalization), and two times the time (date of federalization) variables. And so on. The procedure to compute the coefficients for the other groups of state-owned banks was the same. Hence, Figure 5 preserves the time lengths typically observed in our sample during which the corporate changes were put in effect. The results are similar to those depicted in Figure 4 but with richer dynamic responses. The positive "over time" dynamic impacts of privatization are visible for all four involved groups. This effect is particularly impressive for the directly privatized banks bought by foreigners. Those banks that were directly privatized and bought by domestic banks aimed at leapfrogging the active state-owned banks three periods (one and a half years) after being privatized. Figure 4 suggested a rather disappointing performance for the banks that were first federalized and later privatized to domestic banks. Even after privatization, their productivity was no better than the productivity of the liquidated state-owned banks. Figure 5 helps to explain what happened to such banks. The "over time" effects of federalization were negative to them and the "on impact" effect of privatization was strongly negative. The "over time" effects of privatization, however, are positive.
Actually, this group of banks has the greatest coefficient on the "over time" effects, according to the estimates displayed in Table 12 . It turns out that the privatization of these banks is of a more recent vintage. So, their apparent dismal performance is explained by the fact that the positive impacts of privatization have not taken their full effect yet. Giving time to time, our estimates suggest that these banks are catching-up with the other groups.
Summing up, our results suggest that state-owned banks are less productive than their private peers. Privatization of state-owned banks improves productivity. In special, the beneficial effects of privatization are spread out over many periods. In addition, restructuring the state-owned banks and keeping it under state control seems to be a choice that is dominated by privatization when the dynamic effects are considered.
Conclusions
In the 1990s, the Brazilian banking sector underwent huge transformations.
Following the control of the inflationary process, there was an intense wave of mergers and acquisitions, involving not only domestic agents but also foreign banks. Many stateowned banks were privatized; some of them were closed down. Many troubled private banks also went bust. Improved bank regulation and supervision were also put into action. The purpose of this study was to evaluate how bank productivity was affected by these changes. Particular attention was paid to the effects of the privatization of stateowned banks.
The empirical sections of the paper made use of an unbalanced panel data for 242 commercial banks, observed twice a year, from December 1990 to December 2002.
Bank-level productivity measures were obtained as the difference between actual and expected output, where the latter is the fitted value from the estimation of a production function. The estimated production function follows the strategy suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to account for endogeneity problems.
In the second stage of the investigation, we tried to evaluate the role of some control variables on the level of the bank productivity. Given the varied nature of corporate changes during the sample period, we follow Berger et al. (2003) and try to control for static, selection, and dynamic effects. We also include dummy variables controlling for exited banks. The results show a positive association between productivity and bank market share. It also shows negative effects from the number of bank branches on productivity. Moreover, state-owned banks seem to be less productive than their private competitors. Bank privatization had positive "over time" impact on productivity but restructuring the state-owned banks and keeping it under state control has negative effects on productivity.
The way a state-owned bank is privatized seems to matter when the "over time"
impacts of privatization are not computed. In this setting, straight privatization seems to be a superior strategy than federalization followed by privatization. However, when the impacts of privatization over time are taken into consideration, there is no clear dominance of one form of privatization over the other. There is also no clear dominance in the dynamic performance of privatized banks acquired by foreigners over those acquired by domestic banks and vice versa. Banespa, BEA, and BEG are cases of state-owned banks that were federalized previous to privatization. The other banks displayed in Table 13 were directly privatized.
The four commercial banks that are being prepared for the Central Bank for future privatization include the banks that were previously owned by the following states: Ceará (CE, BEC), Maranhão (MA, BEM), Piauí (PI, BEP), and Santa Catarina (SC, BESC). 
TABLE 13 -Privatized Banks
The source for all the previous variables is COSIF, a monthly report on balance sheet and income statements accounts that all commercial banks in Brazil have to send to the Brazilian Central Bank.
The number of employees is the only variable that does not come from COSIF.
The source of this variable is still the Brazilian Central Bank (DEFIN/DINFO unit).
Nominal values from December 1990 to June 1994 were first transformed into Reais, the new currency in effect from July 1994 onwards (1 Real = 2750 Cruzeiros). 
Constant
B. Explanatory variables in the productivity equation
Market share is the ratio of a bank output to the total output in each time period.
The Brazilian Central Bank (DEFIN/DINFO unit) provided the information on the number of bank branches.
The dummy variables for ownership control and transfer were formed from tables elaborated by the Brazilian Central Bank (DEORF unit) and available online. The only information not readily available was the restructuring date for the banks that kept their state ownership. Thorsten Beck kindly sent us this information, which was collected from different sources, including newspapers.
